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Abstract 
 
Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the world has observed a comprehensive Russian political 
warfare, which has had destabilising consequences and as well as wide-ranging implications for in-
ternational security, in particular for Europe. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Cold War, 
the West mostly focus on public diplomacy and strategic communication rather than political war-
fare. This change creates a gap in all features of political warfare and makes the West weak to politi-
cal warfare waged by particularly one-man ruled states. In this respect, firstly, I will define political 
warfare in the continuum of peace and war. Then, I will develop a new conceptual framework which 
provides an interdisciplinary approach to understand the specifics of political warfare against the 
West and its counteractions. To explore how and why the West has failed in countering and under-
mining political warfare employed by especially one-man ruled states, I will explain the origin and 
evolution of Russian political warfare and particularly highlight the Ukraine Crisis as a turning point 
of Russian political warfare which has been evolving since the 1900s. Finally, I will propose ways and 
means to explain how to counter political warfare using hybrid tactics in the future.  
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INTRODUCTION 
International security experts, aca-
demics, practitioners, and officials high-
light in recent years that changing securi-
ty landscape in the eastern and southern 
flank strengthens the EU’s and NATO’s 
prerequisite to reinforce not only readi-
ness but also responsiveness as well as 
update their soft power (Ratsiborynska, 
2018). 
Since the eruption of the Ukraine 
crisis, the world has witnessed a well-
developed Russian political warfare strat-
egy and the hybrid model, utilised by 
Kremlin, which has had to destabilise con-
sequences and as well as wide-ranging 
implications for international security, in 
particular for Europe. While the concept 
seems like a novelty, in fact, Putin has 
built up current Russian political warfare 
strategy against the West on valuable his-
torical background and experiences dates 
back to the Bolsheviks and the Soviet Un-
ion (Dickey, 2015).  
On the other hand, in the aftermath 
of the Cold War, the West mostly focus on 
public diplomacy and strategic communi-
cation to influence the foreign audience 
rather than political warfare (Boot  & 
Doran, 2013). From my perspective, this 
shift creates a gap in all aspects of politi-
cal warfare and makes the West vulnera-
ble to political warfare waged by particu-
larly one-man ruled states and non-state 
enemies.  
Therefore, it is high time to analyse 
the reasons behind the West, notably 
NATO’s and the EU’s, poor reaction 
against new forms of political warfare as 
well as to find ways to improve their re-
sponse capacity and capabilities through 
a variety of mechanisms. In this paper, the 
first in a series of three articles, I will de-
fine political warfare and its new forms 
such as hybrid methods and blurring war, 
which is to be the basis for the rest of the 
study. Then, I will develop a new concep-
tual framework which provides an inter-
disciplinary approach to understand the 
specifics of political warfare against the 
West and to explore how and why the 
West has failed in countering and under-
mining political warfare employed by es-
pecially one-man ruled states. Finally, I 
will propose ways and means that I will 
go into detail in my further studies to ex-
plain how to counter political warfare in 
the future.  
As most scholars refer to the often-
quoted passage of Clausewitz, I also pre-
fer to start with the very famous state-
ment of him. War is a mere continuation 
of policy by other means (Clausewitz, 
trans. by Rapoport, 1982). Some scholars 
such as Kennan (1948) who have Clause-
witzian perspective, define the political 
warfare as the logical application of 
Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace 
(Dickey, 2015). Seabury & Codevilla 
(1989) extend these arguments by adding 
propaganda, agents of influence, sabotage, 
coups de main, economic sanctions, and 
support for foreign groups to political 
warfare means. To Gray (2009), Peace 
and war are different phases of state-
craft—distinctive, but essentially united 
and permanently connected. 
Thus, we could come to realise that 
political warfare is political because it is a 
strategy that intentionally avoids an open 
war, but at the same time, it is warfare 
because it is covertly violent and adver-
sarial. With its nature, political warfare 
has a distinct character from other forms 
of warfare, as it uses less-bloody means. 
Even though one of the core principles of 
political warfare is to avoid conventional 
war, it is still a form of war between di-
plomacy and conventional war. 
It must be noted that the use of force 
or credible threat of violence is a neces-
sary step for pursuing political warfare. 
With regard to this argument, Seabury & 
Codevilla (1989) highlight that political 
warfare may serve as a surrogate for actu-
al war, but it does not work without actu-
al force backing it up. This is because, as 
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Art (2009) claims, military power under-
girds the other instruments of statecraft. 
In this respect, we could argue that activi-
ties conducted during political warfare 
campaign could easily continue in support 
of conventional war especially in shaping 
the conflict environment. 
A different approach is evident in 
some other scholars such as Hoffman 
(2014) who argues in a Clausewitzian 
sense, all kinds of war could be seen as 
political warfare. They claim that political 
warfare is not new, especially by quoting 
to Sun Tzu’s Art of War in 512 BC and 
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian 
War in 433 BC (Smith, 1989). But Codevil-
la (2009), a political warfare theorist, em-
phasises that the transition from political 
warfare to peace or war is not clear. Con-
trary to the scholars like Hoffman, I would 
argue that political warfare, in the contin-
uum of peace and war, could be seen as an 
early stage of conventional war to shape 
the conflict environment, or as an admix-
ture integrating all means of national 
power which occupies a space between 
war and peace as Sun Tzu stated the high-
est excellence is to subdue the enemy’s 
army without fighting at all (Sun  & Grif-
fith, 1971). 
Needless to say, Clausewitz’s work 
has enjoyed a diverse readership. Among 
them, early communist thinkers such as 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin (even Mao) were 
also familiar with Prussian way of war, 
and no doubt that they were fascinated by 
Clausewitz who claims that war is a real 
political instrument and the servant of 
politics. In this respect, we could hold that 
their understanding of the links between 
politics and war was identical to Marxist 
theory (Dexter, 1950). 
From my point of view, to under-
stand the drivers of Russian political war-
fare, we should examine the longstanding 
Russian imperial identity, sketching from 
its expansion in the 16th century through 
19th centuries and the records of the So-
viet Union (Oliker, Crane, Schwartz, & 
Yusupov, 2009). Particularly during the 
Cold War era -and now as well-, its impe-
rial identity has a crucial role in framing 
Russian political warfare campaign in its 
periphery. Therefore, Russian analysts 
and accounts characterise this periphery 
as “buffer-zone”, namely countries that 
were formerly part of the Soviet Union 
(Trenin, 2011). In conjunction with this 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Russia’s Desired Spheres of Influence 
Source: Radin & Reach, 2017 
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mindset of Hill & Gaddy (2013) also note 
that Vladmir Putin highlighted 
derzhavnost—the belief that Russia is al-
ways destined to be a great power exert-
ing its influence abroad as shown in figure 
1. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The series of three articles will an-
swer the research questions by testing 
the hypothesis using a comparative study 
methodology. A number of methods will 
be used to address the research questions 
and to test the proposed hypotheses. 
Extensive Investigation of Databases, 
Archival and Academic Materials 
In this part, I will identify and cate-
gorise political warfare actions and coun-
teractions which have impacts on the po-
litical environment. Primary sources will 
include declassified documents, diplomat-
ic correspondence, instructions, and case 
analysis. Secondary sources will consist of 
academic studies, interpretations, and re-
flections on the historical and current 
events associated with Putin, the EU, and 
NATO actions and counteractions.  
Firstly, a qualitative analysis of Rus-
sian political warfare will be conducted 
by identifying the evolution of Russian 
political warfare from Bolsheviks to the 
Putin’s era.  
Then I will identify the rise of Russia 
since 2000 and the Russian Grand Strate-
gy with a special focus on Putin’s Era. I 
will examine the utmost important driv-
ers of the rise of Russia such as Gerasimov 
doctrine and military transformation, the 
economic boom in the form of earnings 
from oil and gas exports. Then the case of 
Georgia War in 2008, and the frozen con-
flicts such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, East Ukraine, and 
Transnistria will be presented as evi-
dence that Russia redeveloped political 
warfare capacity and capabilities. After 
building this historical background, I will 
investigate one of the core cases of this 
study: Russian hybrid tactics during the 
Ukrainian crisis as a new generation polit-
ical warfare. 
Secondly, I will explore the EU and 
NATO responses to political warfare em-
ployed by Putin. I will highlight why the 
EU and to some extent NATO responses 
based on appeasement encouraged 
Putin’s aggression, and how and why the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Political Warfare Spectrum  
Source: Steward, 2015 
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efforts of both organisations for deesca-
lating the crisis and conflict, and for coun-
tering political warfare have failed or 
were ineffective. 
I will use Steward (2015)’s analytical 
tool, which extends Kennan (1948)’s 
overt-covert spectrum with direct-
indirect approaches, to assess political 
warfare actions and counteractions as 
shown in Figure 2.  
Application of Theoretical Approaches 
to Political Warfare 
In parallel, I will use the lenses of 
sociology, psychology, economics and po-
litical science in the following articles of 
this study. As group mobilisation or col-
lective action is very important to achieve 
political warfare objectives (Blackstock, 
1964; Seabury & Codevilla, 1989), I will 
apply Social Movement Theory to political 
warfare actions and counteractions of all 
parties to understand the collective dy-
namics of the events. In addition, I will 
also reflect on the true nature of govern-
ance types (liberal democracies vs one-
man ruled states) and relations between 
political warfare and types of governance. 
On this basis, I will investigate applica-
tions of Democratic Peace Theory, Con-
structivism, and Liberalism to the EU and 
NATO, and Realism and Neo-realism to 
Russia. Furthermore, I will focus on appli-
cations of Institutionalist Theory to all 
parties when questioning the role of polit-
ical-military leadership and decision-
making process.  
Internet Survey 
In order to fully understand the driv-
ers of the EU and NATO’s failure in coun-
tering or undermining Putin’s political 
warfare it will be necessary to go directly 
to the staffs, branch and division heads, 
and key leaders working in political af-
fairs, defence planning, intelligence and 
operation divisions, and also crisis re-
sponse process in NATO and the EU. A list
-based sampling frame, including at least 
30 respondents both from NATO and the 
EU, will be conducted in the second arti-
cle. The survey will be conducted via the 
internet to collect data about two main 
topics: effectiveness of the political-
military leadership of the EU and NATO, 
and strategic ends-ways-means of the EU 
and NATO in political warfare and coun-
tering political warfare. 
Follow-up Interviews with Key Leaders 
The questionnaires will be followed 
up with a number of in-depth interviews 
with key leaders such as SACEUR/
DSACEUR, Chief of Staff, Operations and 
Intelligence Division Heads, Director of 
Comprehensive Crisis and Management 
Centre, Chair EU Military Committee, and 
key leaders in European External Action 
Service and European Centre of Excel-
lence for Countering Hybrid Threats. The-
se will be designed to gather information 
regarding effectiveness and shortcomings 
of the crisis response system, readiness 
and responsiveness capacity and capabili-
ties of the EU and NATO from respond-
ents “in their own words” rather than offi-
cial statements. 
Round-table Discussions and Panels    
The interviews will be followed by a 
series of round-table discussions and pan-
els in which civil-military analysts, staff 
officers, branch and/or division heads, 
and academics from the EU, NATO, and 
think tanks (for example Beyond the Hori-
zon, Wilfried Martens Centre for Europe-
an Studies, the German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, International Crisis 
Group, Carnegie Europe, and EGMONT 
Royal Institute for International Rela-
tions) will participate. These will be de-
signed in the last article of this study to 
gather a comprehensive understanding 
and evaluations regarding the full spec-
trum of political warfare waged by Putin, 
the effectiveness of the countermeasures 
of the EU and NATO, comparison of the 
West and Russia regarding deterrence, 
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type of governance, and political-military 
leadership. 
Internet survey, follow-up inter-
views with key leaders, and round-table 
discussions and panels will provide de-
tailed and up-to-date information and al-
so give a chance to gather tacit knowledge 
concerning causes and drivers of the EU 
and NATO’s failure in countering political 
warfare. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this part, I will question actions 
and counteractions of three major actors 
(the EU, NATO, and Russia) in relation to 
the full spectrum of political warfare, by 
applying a multi-disciplinary approach 
and I will develop a set of measures to be 
used in the processes of applying or coun-
tering political warfare. I believe, this 
study would be of benefit to scholars in 
the field of international relations and se-
curity, peace studies or conflict resolu-
tion. The research would also have practi-
cal importance for decision-makers at the 
national and the supra-national level in 
Europe and NATO. The following seven 
hypotheses and the hypothesised model 
in figure 3 which shows the relationship 
between the research questions, hypothe-
ses, and theories, and how the further 
studies work are proposed to be tested in 
my further studies. In this paper, I aim to 
identify hypothesis, but since it requires a 
comprehensive long-term field study on 
the activities of NATO and the EU, albeit 
this paper also provides initial findings 
related to some hypothesis such as H1-4, I 
plan to test them in my further studies. 
Next steps of this research will be primar-
ily based on extensive investigation of da-
tabases, archival and academic materials; 
internet survey; follow-up interviews 
with key leaders; round-table discussions 
which could gather tacit knowledge on 
the root causes and drivers of the EU and 
NATO’s failure in countering political 
warfare.     
Proposed Hypotheses and Hypothe-
sized Model 
H1: The Russian Grand Strategy 
since 2000, military transformation, and 
the Gerasimov doctrine have developed 
Russian political warfare capacity and ca-
pabilities. H2: Liberal democracies acting 
as “a strategic sponsor” in international 
organisations are more vulnerable to po-
litical warfare employed by one-man 
ruled countries that are also responsible 
for their own security. H3: In the frame-
work of political warfare; NATO and the 
EU’s deterrence capacity and capabilities 
are less effective or sufficient than Russia. 
H4: In the framework of political warfare; 
the EU has less effective countermeasures 
against Russian political warfare on the 
West. H5:Current decision-making pro-
cess and political-military leadership in 
the EU and NATO have significant disad-
vantages when compared to the autocrat-
ic regimes which have uniform command 
and control structure, and political front. 
H6: Transformation and enhanced coop-
eration in defence planning and compre-
hensive crisis response process between 
the EU and NATO develops defence capac-
ity and capabilities of these two organisa-
tions to conduct political warfare and un-
dermine or counter political warfare.H7: 
If NATO and the EU reduce the dependen-
cy of the US protection and power projec-
tion, the two organisations can develop 
defence capacity and capabilities against 
external threats and risks. 
Evolution of Russian Political Warfare 
Additionally, analysis of the origin 
and the evolution of Russian political war-
fare reveal that Russia has been using po-
litical warfare not only to gain regional 
dominance in its buffer-zone, but also 
challenge the unipolarity of the West, and 
undermine the role of NATO and the EU 
(Dickey, 2015; Steward 2015). To illus-
trate this argument, I would also mention 
that Russia has sought to strengthen its 
status as a great power through its sup-
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port for the UN; Brazil, Russia, India, Chi-
na, and South Africa (BRICS) association; 
the OSCE, the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization; the Eurasian Union and other 
organizations that support the role of re-
gional powers (Lukin, 2016). In this re-
spect, we should revisit the frozen con-
flicts such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, East Ukraine, and 
Transnistria as evidence and toolkit that 
Russia redeveloped political warfare ca-
pacity and capabilities in order to gain 
influence in its near abroad neighbouring 
NATO and the EU borders. The rise of 
crude oil and natural gas prices since the 
late 1990s and early 2000s have promot-
ed the resurgence of Russia and its mili-
tary transformation as utmost important 
enablers of Russian political warfare and 
Russian supranationalism, rising in recent 
years as shown in Figure 4. 
The current Russian political war-
fare strategy, dating back to Bolsheviks 
and now using hybrid methods which was 
mainly shaped by Gerasimov (Chief of the 
Russian General Staff)’s doctrine, asks for 
a holistic, harmonised approach that com-
prises political, economic, humanitarian, 
informational, and other non-military in-
struments (Suzen, 2014). In conjunction 
with the Gerasimov doctrine, Russian 
Federation 2010 Military Doctrine, 
amended in 2014, conceptualised Russian 
political warfare. In that document, 
“simultaneous use of military and non-
military mean…” was emphasised. In oth-
er words, “Russia is making full use of its 
diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic levers of power” (Dickey, 
2015). 
On this basis, Putin developed a 
strategy to use soft power elements in 
sync with military means (Reisinger & 
Golts, 2014).   In his speech at the Valdai 
International Discussion Club’s annual 
meeting in 2014, Putin argued that “the 
Western system of order threatened Rus-
sian interests”, and he also urged that “if 
the existing system of international rela-
tions, international law and the checks 
and balances in place got in the way of 
these aims, this system was declared 
worthless, outdated and in need of imme-
diate demolition.”  Based on his state-
ments, we could hold that, from Russian 
view, -especially with their enlargement- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Hypothesized Model for Further Studies 
Source: Processed by the author, 2017 
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the EU and NATO, and other institutions 
related to them are threatening Russian 
security and influence within its “buffer-
zone” extends in the post-Soviet space. 
To me, the Ukraine Crisis is a turning 
point of Russian political warfare which 
has been evolving since the 1900s. In 
2014, in the following months of violent 
turbulence in Ukraine, masked Russian 
Special Forces and Russian backed para-
military groups, known as “little green 
men”, seized government buildings and 
key infrastructure in Crimea. In reality, 
this de facto invasion was not a surprise, 
but a deliberate and long-term political 
warfare strategy directed by the Kremlin. 
A closer look at Russian political warfare 
reveals that hybrid methods using soft 
and hard power elements in a mutually 
complementary and supportive manner 
are camouflaged by professional propa-
ganda and strategic communication. 
(Suzen, 2016). This Soviet-style disrup-
tion uses “masked warfare” with the addi-
tion of computers, social and mass media, 
and deception operations paralysed the 
Ukrainian government and the interna-
tional community, and they could take no 
action (Dickey, 2015). Furthermore, Rus-
sia conducted cyber-attacks against 
Ukraine (Kofman & Rojansky, 2015; 
Pyung-Kyun, 2015), organised Pro-
Russian Ukrainians to manipulate and ter-
rorise Eastern Ukraine.  Putin manipulat-
ed the outcome of the referendum, which 
resulted in favour of annexation as well. 
(Reisinger & Golts, 2014). Putin did not 
even hesitate to play the “energy card” at 
every opportunity by exploiting Ukraine 
and Europe’s energy dependency on Rus-
sia (Popescu, 2014). Additionally, Russia 
has also exported instability to Ukraine 
through the use of economic warlords, 
mafia, and criminals whose origins are 
linked to the late-Soviet era black market 
(Dickey, 2015). 
In the early period of his first term, 
Putin pursued closer relations with NATO 
and the EU , as Trenin (2006) summa-
rised , Russia changed its view and left the 
Western solar system to create their Mos-
cow-centered strategy. At this point, I 
have to mention the most important driv-
er of this shift, Eurasianism, discussed by 
some Russian intellectuals such as Ale-
ksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Panarin, who 
argued: “a version of reintegration of the 
post-Soviet space into a Eurasian sphere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Survey Results on the Scope of Russia’s National Interests 
Source: Rivera, Bryan, Camacho-Lovell, Fineman, Klemmer, & Emma, 2016  
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Table 1. A Comparison of Political Warfare Spectrum  
Source: Processed by the author, 2017 
 
Actions and  
Counteractions 
Overt  
Direct 
Overt  
Indirect 
Covert  
Direct 
Covert  
Indirect  
Putin’s Hybrid Tactics/
Blurred War 
- Energy blackmail 
- Economic manipulation 
- Strategic communication 
- White propaganda 
- Mil exercises for deter-
rence 
- Military build-up along 
the Ukrainian border 
- Annexation of Crimea 
- Hybrid tac-
tics in East-
ern Europe 
- Russian 
military build
-up in Black 
Sea, Baltic 
Sea, Eastern 
Mediterrane-
an, and Syria 
- Strategic de-
ception 
- Psychological 
warfare/ infor-
mation opera-
tions 
- Black Propa-
ganda 
- Diplomatic 
support to oppo-
sitions 
- Cyber and troll 
attacks 
- Mobilized lo-
cals 
- Armed civilians 
- Para-military 
forces 
- Exporting corruption  
- Providing financial 
support to Russian-
backed groups 
- Political destabiliza-
tion 
- Russian trojan horses 
such as Turkey 
NATO Counteractions  - Strategic Communication 
(The NATO-Russia Council 
meetings) 
- Assurance measures in 
Eastern Europe and Turkey  
  * Mil exercises for deter-
rence including high visibil-
ity exercises (eg. Trident 
Juncture) 
  * Enhanced forward pres-
ence 
  * NATO’s VJTF (Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force) 
  * Enhanced Air Policing 
- Adaptation Measures 
  * New NATO Command 
Structure (JFC-A, JSEC, 
Cyber Operations Centre, 
MNC-NE, MND-NE, MND-
SE, NFIUs) 
- Suspension of all practical 
cooperation with Russia 
(Suspension of NRC, expul-
sion of Russian diplomats) 
- Alliance 
cohesion 
- Partnership 
with the 
countries in 
Russian buff-
er-zone 
- Cyber defense - ? 
The EU Counteractions  - Strategic Communication 
- Public diplomacy 
- Economic sanctions 
-  EU-Ukraine 
AA/DCFTA  
- Lifting arms 
embargo on 
UKR 
-  Common 
External En-
ergy Policy 
- Diplomatic 
support to legal 
governments 
- ? 
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of influence for Russia” (Dugin, 2012). By 
this change, there is no doubt that the 
Ukraine crisis was a dramatic shift away 
from the West. To this end, it must be not-
ed that Russian way of warfare began ini-
tially by Bolsheviks, then kept by Soviets 
after World War II, evolved throughout 
the Cold War, and finally revisited by 
Kremlin, following the turn towards au-
thoritarianism in the 1990s (Zimmerman, 
2014). Additionally, from my understand-
ing, Russian involvement in Syria in con-
trast with Western objectives, and Russia-
Turkey rapprochement that enables Rus-
sia to use Turkey as a trojan horse within 
the Alliance should be seen as a part of 
current Russian political warfare against 
the West as well. 
Application of Theoretical Approaches 
to Political Warfare 
In this paper, to provide a ground for 
next studies, I use Steward (2015)’s ana-
lytical tool, which extends Kennan 
(1948)’s overt-covert spectrum with di-
rect-indirect approaches, to assess politi-
cal warfare actions and counteractions of 
all parties as shown in Figure 1. 
This analytical tool offers to evaluate 
political warfare actions, counteractions, 
and also contributes to develop a compre-
hensive approach in identifying effective 
practices for increased foreign affairs, se-
curity and defence establishments’ in-
volvement in political warfare in the fu-
ture. Table 1 shows us the toolkit and var-
ious techniques employed by Russia, 
which enable a political warfare actor to 
identify the general areas that can be ma-
nipulated in support of a political warfare 
objective. According to the Table 1, Rus-
sian political warfare actions can range 
from clandestine support of underground 
Russian-backed groups to all hard and 
soft instruments available to Russians 
such as black propaganda, agents of influ-
ence, sabotage, economic sanctions, cyber
-attacks, and use of force as well; while 
NATO and the EU counteractions are 
based on primarily public diplomacy, 
strategic communication, and limited eco-
nomic sanctions and assurance measures. 
From my perspective, I hardly doubt 
that the uniform command provides Rus-
sia with a kind of situational superiority 
and an advantage in execution against 
both the EU and NATO and an opportuni-
ty for a systematic concentration of state 
authority. As group mobilisation or collec-
tive action is very important to achieve 
political warfare objectives (Blackstock, 
1964; Seabury and Codevilla, 1989), in my 
further studies, I will apply Social Move-
ment Theory to political warfare actions 
and counteractions of all parties to under-
stand the collective dynamics of the 
events. Additionally, I will discuss the true 
nature of governance types (liberal de-
mocracies vs one-man ruled states) and 
its relations with political warfare. To 
achieve afore-mentioned goals, I will in-
vestigate applications of Democratic 
Peace Theory, Constructivism, and Liber-
alism to the EU and NATO, and Realism 
and Neo-realism to Russia. Furthermore, I 
will focus on applications of Institutional-
ist Theory to all parties when questioning 
the role of political-military leadership 
and decision-making process. 
 CONCLUSION 
This article, as the first of three arti-
cles in the series, proposed a conceptual 
framework and some supporting models 
for policymakers, planners, and practi-
tioners to better understand the new 
form of political warfare. Taking the new 
form of political warfare currently waged 
by Putin against the West into considera-
tion, it could be argued that EU and 
NATO’s response to Putin’s protracted 
hybrid strategy has been ineffective. From 
my point of view, the EU and to some ex-
tent NATO’s responses based on appease-
ment encourage Putin’s aggression. In 
other words, NATO and EU lack strategy, 
policy, and the organisational framework 
for both implementing an effective politi-
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cal warfare strategy and countering 
thereof. 
Putin’s political warfare affects the 
Western security and stability in three 
ways: a) it destabilizes the global security 
status quo, b) it threatens the EU’s and 
NATO’s solidarity and cohesion and un-
dermine their roles in the international 
system, c) it sets an example for other 
possible adversaries how political war-
fare could be a valuable and effective way 
of war to target liberal democracies with-
out triggering any armed conflict. 
Although I will go in details in my 
further studies, based on the initial find-
ings of this paper, I would like to highlight 
the following points which could bridge 
the gap between the conceptual frame-
work presented in this paper and prac-
tice. First, The EU and NATO must keep 
dialogue channels with Russia open. Se-
cond, rather than limiting NATO and EU 
enlargement demonstrating the rights of 
former Soviet republics to secure their 
future, NATO and the EU must use a wide 
range of military and political tools to de-
ter Russian aggression and preserve the 
liberal order, and the last to counter Rus-
sian efforts to divide and freeze the EU 
and the Alliance, the EU and NATO need 
for defence building or military transfor-
mation process in some particular areas 
such as decision-making, crisis response 
and operation management, and concept 
of operational art in order to launch and 
counter political warfare. 
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